> where is a school to be found, like the chamber of sickness for meekness, patience, resignation, gratitude, and devout trust in God? There pride is humbled; the angry passions subside; animosities cease; and the vanities of the world lose their bewitching attractions. False associations are there corrected; true estimates are formed; and whilst the *passive virtues* are cultivated in the suffering individual, all who minister to him have their best dispositions exercised, and improved.[132]

This vision of the hospital as a finishing school for the Pauline virtues had as its corollary the idealized Christian-Stoic death. The 'good death' was a demonstration of passive resignation as well as the exercise of one's final duty to family and friends.

The invocation of the family as the model for the hospital and the suggestion that hospitalization was an extension of domestic life was not a form of unthinking traditionalism and it had an important justificatory stratagem. Because the medical profession was always suspected of Faustian interference in the providential scheme of life, it was important for those concerned with the morals of medicine to show that the activities and institutions of the profession had a special role in the divine plan. Yet, to many contemporaries, this seemed to be in conflict with the aspirations of medicine as a science to be able to interfere more and more effectively in the course of nature. The seriousness of the conflict between religion and *science* can only be understood if we appreciate just how ingrained was the providentialist way of thinking about health and sickness. Percival's mode of expression in the following passage is typical:

> Health, as consisting in the soundness and vigour of the bodily organs, and in their complete aptitude for exertion and enjoyment, is doubtless of inestimable consideration. But the occasional suspension of this blessing may be necessary to obviate the abuses to which it is liable; to evince its high value; to remedy the injuries it may have sustained; and to insure its future more permanent duration. A strong constitution is too often made subservient to sensuality, ebriety, and other licentious indulgencies, which, if not seasonably interrupted by the experience of *consequential suffering*, would prove destructive to the animal œconomy, and bring on premature decripetude [*sic*] or death.

Percival did, however, acknowledge that sickness was not always beneficial and that it was 'obstructive of those *active offices*, which, in his present sphere, man is called upon to perform'.[133]

Just as, in a modern view, pain is a 'warning' of impending harm

Материал, защищенный авторским правом

to the body, so illness was a divine admonition of physical and moral dissolution. Like poverty, illness was not considered to be an unmitigated evil, and this meant resistance to the activities of the medical profession. There was, for example, great aversion on the part of many Britons to smallpox inoculation. While there were a variety of reasons for this, an important one was that it was an impious interference with God's will.[134]

It is apparent from young Percival's sermon that some form of religious justification was essential to the creation of the modern voluntary hospital. The medical profession especially needed a framework within which its members, in the light of new knowledge and science, could adjust the categories of the divine dispensation without being accused of questioning the dispensation itself. Thus Percival's claims to be doing Christ's work and to be doing so within institutions that were extensions of the sacramentally founded family were attempts in this direction. It could perhaps be argued that the acquisition of new scientific knowledge brought into prominence traditional ideas as a moral defence of the medical profession and its institutions, particularly the hospital, at the very time that these were being transformed. As one famous contemporary noted cynically (though clearly not unapprovingly), 'those legislators who established institutions for the good of the body, under the pretext of serving heaven for the salvation of the soul ... might with strict propriety be termed pious frauds ...'[135]

The New Gentleman

The shift in focus from the domestic sphere to the public hospital was a major and lasting change in medical practice and medical science. It was undoubtedly because of its magnitude that the moral appreciation of the new situation was (and, to some extent, still is) couched in such ambiguous terms as those indicated above. Much the same can be said about another transformation in which Percival's *Medical Ethics* was implicated, the change in the ideal of the medical man himself. This was a subtle process which we best can approach through some comparisons with Gregory's work a quarter of a century before Percival's.

In Gregory's medical ethics, the connection between the medical profession, the gentry and the aristocracy was portrayed as an ideal relationship. This was not, as I have argued, merely because of the financial advantages and status associated with aristocratic patronage and a select clientele. For Gregory there was, as well, the more

Материал, защищенный авторским правом

important connection between gentlemanly and philosophic (or scientific) status. In this he claimed for his profession no more than the clergy claimed for theirs. It was, as he knew, in the circles and clubs of liberally educated gentlemen that the new science was born and it was through the powerful patronage network of this period that Baconian and Newtonian science flourished in the universities and philosophical clubs of Scotland. Such a fruitful union of landed and professional interests could hardly be neglected by the rising men of this period, least of all by Dr Gregory who encouraged his own students to aspire to the status of gentlemen scholars. Thus, for the advancement of medicine as well as for their personal advancement, medical students were to be groomed as men of 'honour and ingenious manners' as well as disinterested scientists.[136]

In direct contrast to this ideal gentleman physician (or surgeon) were those less than honourable members of the faculty who 'live by medicine as a profession' and who therefore have 'an interest separate and distinct from that of science'. Such men, according to Gregory (echoing Bacon), were more likely to concern themselves with 'the private police of a corporation, or the little arts of a craft' than with the real business of medicine, namely the duties of a liberal profession whose object is the life and health of the human species.[137]

Gregory also contrasted the high repute of medicine in Britain with the poor reputation it, in his view, suffered on the Continent. He suggested that British medicine was superior because it was, first, independent of government interference and, second, it was able to attract 'gentlemen of the best families, distinguished for their spirit and genius'.[138] As we have seen, in the concluding lecture of his medical ethics, he evoked the Royal Society view that medicine could only be advanced with the co-operation and patronage of 'gentlemen of fortune' who were 'not fettered by early prejudices and who were unawed by authority and unbiassed by interest'.[139]

It was in the alliance of meritocratic science with aristocratic wealth and its independence that Gregory saw the prospect of creating a liberal profession. This was, in the eyes of his contemporaries, a courageous prescription for breaking the stranglehold of the traditional élite, namely the Oxford and Cambridge-trained Fellows of the Royal College of Physicians. His medical ethics was thus less concerned with the daily problems of medical practice than with the delineation of the gentlemanly philosophic physician modelled on the Robert Boyles and the Sir John Pringles of the Royal Society.

Материал, защищенный авторским правом

Thomas Percival was also a committed Baconian but, unlike Gregory, he did not think medical reform depended on the support of the younger sons of the gentry and aristocracy. Nor did he believe that the advancement of medicine depended on the patronage and participation of 'gentlemen of fortune'. He was not antagonistic toward the aristocracy, but his criticism of some of their values certainly had a sharper edge than Gregory's. Here more than anywhere one can perceive his allegiance to a provincial world of commerce as articulated in a Dissenting education. It was, of course, a world that had been much more clearly delineated in the short span of time between Gregory and himself.

Unlike Gregory, for example, Percival did not specifically denounce the effects of luxury. He preferred to celebrate the new spirit of commerce and its usefulness to society; particularly its capacity for generating knowledge as well as increasing material prosperity.[140]

While Percival shared Gregory's high admiration for men like Boyle and Pringle, his medical ethics put far more emphasis on the contribution of ordinary practising physicians and on the necessity of collaboration between many different groups of practitioners and laymen to ensure the progress of medicine. Much more than his predecessor, Percival was aware that practical and experimental medical science were converging and that the modern hospital and its auxiliaries were the new location of medical discovery and progress. He also realized that creation of medical knowledge would no longer be the domain of independently wealthy gentlemen but 'interested' ones who, like himself, lived by their profession and nevertheless remained committed to the Baconian ethos of the Royal Society.

New medical students, William Brockbank noted in his history of the Manchester Infirmary, were, at the time when Percival wrote his medical ethics, actively recruited from the ranks of the less endowed classes. In November 1793, for example, two Manchester newspapers displayed the following advertisement:

> The Physicians of the Manchester Infirmary Dispensary, Lunatic Hospital and Asylum, desirous of communicating the opportunities of instruction afforded by the extensive plan of these institutions, propose to admit pupils on such terms as to place the means of acquiring the most valuable information within the reach of persons in moderate circumstances. At the same time the nature of the practice offers peculiar advantages even to those students who are enabled to seek for improvement in the knowledge and treatment of diseases wherever it can be found.[141]

Материал, защищенный авторским правом

While Gregory may have raised the question of how these two roles, the scientific and the professional, could be combined, it was Percival who, twenty years later, addressed it as a set of practical problems for his profession. In order to do so effectively, he had to convince his contemporaries that the ideal doctor was still a gentleman, a scholar and a practising Christian.

Drawing on and contributing to the period's practical ethics and general conduct literature, many of the century's best-known literary men wrestled with the problem of what a gentleman should be and saw this as part of wider reforms in social manners. Authors as different as Locke, Defoe, Addison, Richardson, Blackstone, Gisborne, Paley, Robertson and Franklin had opinions on these topics which Percival either quoted or echoed in his own discussion of them. The focus of their criticism was an out-dated aristocratic ideal of the gentleman and to a degree that is difficult to imagine today, this ideal was symbolized by duelling, a practice sanctioned by the 'gentleman's code of honour'. The importance of this topic to Percival's contemporaries may be grasped from the response of some readers to Samuel Richardson's well-known character, Sir Charles Grandison, whom the author dared to depict as a perfect gentleman but who nevertheless refused a challenge to defend his honour in a duel. Richardson explained that the notion of honour which impelled a man to accept such a challenge was 'an absurd and mischievous one'. True bravery, he argued,

> is to adhere to all duties under all disadvantages; and that refusing a duel is a duty to ourselves, our fellow-creatures, and our MAKER. And whosoever acts on these principles, the more reproach he undergoes for it, rather than be driven, like a coward, by the scoffs of his fellow-subjects to rebel against the Sovereign of the Universe will have the more delightful consciousness of a strong inward principle of piety and virtue.[142]

Like Grandison, the new gentleman, including the gentleman physician, spurned the patrician code, not from fear, but from the principles of reason and religion.

Such use of the law of honour as a simple heuristic device for attacking 'the fashionable ethic' was common. Moreover, the moralists, upon whose works the novelists sometimes drew for their characters and incidents, frequently presented their own moral schemes against the background of the moral problems inherent in the traditional gentleman's code. William Paley began his *Moral and Political Philosophy* with a comparison of the three codes by which

Материал, защищенный авторским правом